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Abstract: In this paper, we provide a very simple model to shed light on the
issue of managed competition in mixed quasi-markets (i.e. regulated markets
in which social and for-prot rms coexist). In doing this, we consider the
literature on mixed oligopolies as a reasonable reference point and try to enrich it
with the idea of quasi-market. Firstly, our results show that social rms serve the
relatively richer portion of the population. Only relatively poor consumers buy
units of service from the prot-oriented rm. Secondly, the socially-preferable
form of managed competition is to introduce coproduction practices and, hence,
to raise prot-oriented rms production costs. The di¤usion of coproduction
paradigms ensures maximal service quality and eliminates mark-up from the
market.
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1 Introduction
Social rms have been, in recent years, at the centre of the large debate
about the social economy. They can solve public and private market failures, en-
sure a su¢ ciently high level of positive social externalities as well as implement
participatory models of service provision in which users became active agents in
dening what service quality means. Despite their central position in the con-
temporary debate on welfare state reforms, social rms have been seen widely as
socially-sensible organizations primarily focused on the needs of the absolutely
poor. This is certainly true for economies in which the public sector does not
provide directly social services or public-interest goods. In these circumstances,
social rms have to play the role of "provider of last resort". However, there are
cases in which absolutely poor consumers are served by public institutions and
the other ones populate regulated markets (quasi-markets, henceforth) where
social and prot-oriented rms coexist. In this last scenario, competition can
be gured out as a market game between technically-e¢ cient, prot-maximizing
rms and socially-sensible organizations that implement forms of coproduction2 .
The concept of coproduction is related to the involvement of citizen, or
users, in the production process of social or municipal services. This synergy can
occur between a service producer (i.e. a public rm or a voluntary organization)
and its clients who desire to became, through the service, healthier, better
educated or safer persons. These individuals can participate, at various levels,
to the organization of the service and their active role induces, at a micro
level, virtuous behavior which increases service e¤ectiveness. Indeed, because of
shared, democratic and participative production processes3 , coproduction social
services is likely not only to fosters service userssocial participation and self-
empowerment capacity, two important goals of any social enterprise, but also
to increase social rmscosts. But, how coproduction can a¤ect competition in
quasi-market? No research has been, until now, devoted to the last issue.
Competition in quasi-markets can be inuenced also by the existence of
positive social externalities related to consumption. Social rms can give value
to this externality and to the degree of service di¤usion, nishing for maximiz-
ing their quantity of demand. In this respect, it is worth-noting that Merril
and Schneider (1966), in their pioneering paper, assume that the objective of
the public authority is the maximization of the total amount of the commodity
produced. Obviously, they impose a budget constraint on the public rm in
order to avoid it producing an innite amount of the good4 . But hence, how to
manage competition in mixed quasi-markets? And, more important, how can
2On the idea of co-production of social and community services see Parks et al. (1981),
Ostrom (1999), Pesto¤ (2009).
3 In particular, it is usual to refer to three layers of co-production: (i ) co-governance, i.e.
to arrange forms of participation in the planning and delivery of services; (ii ) co-management,
that is an arrangement such that citizen can assume some strategic decisions and (iii ) direct
co-production in which users produce at least some units of their service.
4For a discussion of the relevance of playersobjective functions in the analysis of compe-
tition in mixed oligopoly, see De Fraja (2009).
2
we compare di¤erent forms of managed competition in markets of this sort?
The concept of managed competition will be conceived, hereafter, from a mech-
anism design perspective5 : by using regulatory tools, public authorities can
design the market game. Therefore, we shall discuss di¤erent regulatory regimes
among which a regulator can choose6 . In particular, we take the literature on
mixed oligopolies as a reasonable reference point and try to enrich it with the
idea of quasi-market, thus providing a very simple model focused on the issue
of managed competition in quasi-markets. Firstly, our results show that so-
cial rms serve the relatively richer portion of the population. Only relatively
poor consumers buy units of service from the prot-oriented rm. Secondly, the
socially-preferable form of managed competition is to introduce coproduction
practices and, hence, to raise prot-oriented rms production costs. The di¤u-
sion of coproduction paradigms ensures maximal service quality and eliminates
mark-up from the market. All this renders us an interesting picture of how
mixed quasi-markets operate.
The essay is organized as follows.In the next Section we briey mention
the related literature, then, in Section 3, we present our set-up.Main results
are derived and discussed in Section 4.The last Section, as usual, concludes the
article.
2 Related Literature
A mixed oligopoly is a market where a good, or service, is supplied by a
small number of enterprises to a large number of buyers, and the goal of at least
one rm di¤ers from that of other producers. As such, an oligopoly is mixed
whenever it houses rms with di¤erent objective functions. Although most of
the literature has been focused on the coexistence of private (prot-maximizing)
rms and public (welfare-maximizing) rms (see De Fraja (2009) for a survey),
other types of cohabitation t the denition of mixed oligopoly. Delbono and
Rossini (1992), for instance, consider the interaction between public, capitalistic
and labour-managed rms in an homogeneous oligopoly. More recently, De
Donder and Romer (2009), by using a more sophisticated model, examine a
duopoly where one rm maximizes prot while the other maximizes revenue.
The literature on mixed oligopolies has been fairly large in the last
twenty years. Unsurprisingly, one of the main questions addressed in many
papers deals with the optimal strategy to be undertaken by the owner of the
public rm to achieve other social targets. Of course, the conclusions are sensible
5For a di¤erent way to model managed competition in oligopoly see Wolinsky (1997).
6The literature of the economics of regulation is very large and a wide portion of it has been
focused on second-best regulation. The issue is traditionally approached by using complete
information models and by assessing the relative goodness of di¤erent regulatory solutions
in terms of social welfare. In what follows, nevertheless, we focus on second-best regulation
under complete information.
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to the rule of the competitive game, the cost structures of rms and so on7 . For
instance, if we take a private rm and a public one with no capacity constraints,
as in De Fraja and Delbono (1989), in order to increase social welfare, the public
rm has to behave like a Stackelberg leader only if its cost function is not strictly
concave. Contrarily, when costs are concave, a public rm that plays the role of
Stackelberg follower is better o¤ by using the so-called propagation of marginal
cost pricing rule.
Another distinctive feature of this piece of economic literature is its
focusing on goods-producing industries. Utilities, airlines, steel, transportation,
just to quote few examples. However, despite several waves of privatization,
the range of situations in which we observe mixed competition is still large
in many countries and extends, for example, to service-producing sectors like
health care, education, child-care, housing. In particular, social services are
usually exchanged through mixed oligopolies in which public providers, not-
for-prot organizations and prot-maximizing rms co-habit. These market
structures, because of the existance of regulatory interventions on both market
sides market - together with some public supply of the service- are usually named
quasi-markets (see Le Grand (1991)).
The economic literature on quasi-markets has been fairly focused on the
main di¤erences between a quasi- and a conventional market structure. From
di¤erent viewpoints, many contributions have emphasized ve main spheres of
diversity (see Barlett and Le Grand (1993), Deakin and Michie (1997), McMas-
ter (2001), McMaster (2002)): (i) private property rights can be more di¢ cult to
dene in quasi-markets than in conventional one because of the widespread dif-
fusion of public-private partnerships, or contracting-out policies, which simply
delegate private producers to organize service delivery; (ii) in quasi-markets, dif-
ferent kinds of service provider (non-prot organization, for-prot rms, public
institutions etc...) exist and, since many producers cannot fail or/and are pub-
licly owned, competition alone has a light disciplinary role; (iii) the price mech-
anism can only work imperfectly in quasi-markets because of political prices,
vouchers and the like; (iv) services provided by quasi-market rms are not sim-
ple market commodities, but social goods whose consumption generates positive
social externalities; (v) regulation policies a¤ect in di¤erent ways (quality stan-
dards, price regulation, universal service obligations etc...) the supply side of
the quasi-market. In the social functioning of quasi-markets, social norms of
behavior, social capital institutions and the degree of solidarity between social
groups are relevant elements as well.
An important lack of the quasi-market literature is its loose analysis of
how market competition between di¤erently-motivated rms takes place. On the
one hand, given the applied nature of most of the contributions on quasi-market
reforms, this weakness seems natural. Some articles, for instance Chalkley and
Malcomson (1996), discuss the topic, but they do not propose any formal model.
On the other hand, because the idea of managed competition, i.e. a competitive
7See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a taxonomy of the early literature and De Fraja
(2009) for a more recent review. See also the interesting paper by Matsumura and de Kanda
(2005) with its references.
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game between private players organized and managed by public institutions,
should suit well in the economics of quasi-markets, the above lack is quite sur-
prising. However, to the best of our knowledge, the concept has been widely
neglected by scholars involved in the subject. Such a missed link, however, has
caused permanent decits of quasi-market models and generated vague policy
guidelines without solid foundations in competition theory.
Exactly to approach the issue of managed competition, the mixed oligopoly
literature, joint with some elements of regulation economics, can advance our
understanding of how quasi-markets operate. Consistently, we propose to ana-
lyze competition in a mixed oligopoly in which some regulatory constraints alter
the market game. More precisely, we consider a no-regulation equilibrium and
compare it with alternative market equilibria which result from possible forms
of managed competition. Furthermore, we build an analytical set-up consistent
with features (ii) and (v) of a quasi-market. On the supply side, we suppose
to have a prot-maximizing rms and a social rm interested in the di¤usion
of the service in the population (e.g. a rm that maximizes the quantity of
demand). On the demand side, we shall consider only those members of a given
population who have no right to access, for some reasons, to publicly-nanced
services. Actually, in this way, we shall limit our discussion to mixed (private
and regulated) quasi-markets.
3 The Model
In this Section, we provide denitions and notation. Before we start, how-
ever, two elements have to be stressed. First of all, consumers we consider are
only a part of the whole population of service users. The number of consumers
acting in the quasi-market is here assumed to be the welfare-maximizing one8 .
Secondly, the regulator cannot implement, even if the market game is a perfect
information game, rst-best regulation because it cannot use more than one
regulatory tool at the same time (in our case one variable among c,  and s).
Such a scarcity of policy instruments with respect to policy goals reminds the
old political economy literature (see, among others, Mundell (1960)) in which a
loss functions was used in order to choose between suboptimal outcomes. Our
function of expression (7) is inspired by those contributions.
3.1 The Demand Side
Consider N consumers, equals in all respects except for the willingness to
pay () for a given service. Willingness to pay is uniformly distributed on the
8A possible model for making endogeneous the number of consumers to be served by a
quasi-market can be found in Lanzi (1998).
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unit interval

; 

with  = +1 and each consumer buys always only one unit
of the good/service. Buyerspreferences are supposed to be represented by the
following utility function:
uk = (sk + s k)  pk (1)
where pk is the price, sk stands for the hedonic quality of the good provided
by rm k (with k = i; j), s k indicates the quality of service of the other rm and
 2 [0; 1) is the degree of systemic integration between the two services. When
 ! 1, the total quality of service k is equal to the aggregate system quality
and we have full systemic e¤ects. Contrarily, if  = 0 no systemic e¤ects on
quality exist. Hence, total quality coincides with service-specic hedonic quality.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that sk 2 [s; s] with s = s+ 1 > 19 :
Under standard assumptions, the indi¤erent consumer can be identied
as follows:

0
(si + sj)  pi = 
0
(sj + si)  pj (2)
or, if sj > si, as

0
=
pj   pi
(1  ) (sj   si) (3)
By using expression (3), we obtain rmsdemand functions:
Di = N
h

0   
i
(4)
Dj = N
h
1 +    0
i
The substitution of (3) in (4) gives us their complete specication.
9 In order to appreciate the role of  in our model, an example can be useful. Suppose
to have a private producer who is unable to mobilize all necessary resources for achieving a
given level of service quality. With no systemic integration ( = 0), he/she has no access to
other rms infrastructures and facilities and, therefore, his/her service quality will decrease.
Contrarly, with full systemic integration ( ! 1) the producer at stake will have full access to
its rivalsresources for quality, and he/she will be able to mitigate service quality reductions.
Real world examples of this kind of systemic integration between service providers can be
found in health and social sectors.
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3.2 The Supply Side
On the supply side, we have two producers who do not face capacity con-
straints. First, a prot-oriented rm (i) that produces one unit of good at a
constant marginal cost ci > 0. Firm i maximizes prots with respect to pi and
si and its decisional problem can be written as follows:
max
pi;si
i = Di (pi   ci) (5)
The second player is a social rm that produces, by using coproduction
models, one unit of the good at a constant marginal cost cj > ci > 4  cj . The
social rm maximizes with respect to price and quality the number of users it
reaches under a balanced-budget constraint; formally:
max
pj ;sj
Dj = N  Di s:t: (pj   cj)Dj = 0 (6)
Finally, let us suppose that quality and price decisions are made sequen-
tially. More precisely, we deal with a two-stage game with perfect and complete
information. In the rst stage, players set quality, then, in the second stage,
they decide selling prices. As usual, we use backward induction to determine
subgame perfect equilibria (SPE, henceforth).
3.3 The Regulatory Policies
The mixed oligopoly described above can be subjected to several regulatory
regimes. A regulatory agency values them in terms of social loss through the
following function:
L =
X
k
mk +  +
X
k
k (7)
where mk is the absolute mark-up applied by rm k,  = 1    measures
the degree of closedness of the services system, and k = s   sk indicates the
amount of quality degradation for services k10 . Obviously, the bliss outcome is:
LBL = 0 =) mk = k =  = 0 (8)
10Another possibility is to assign weights to mk and k given by the number of served
consumers. In this paper, however, we shall use un unweighted loss function.
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In other words, the socially preferable solution is a totally-integrated
system of service provision with maximal hedonic quality and competitive prices.
This would be, presumably, the outcome chosen by a public monopolist11 . How-
ever, for some reasons that here we can black-box, this outcome cannot be im-
plemented and the regulator has to select that, suboptimal, regulatory compact
that minimizes L. The regulators choice set is nite and contains the three
alternative regimes described below:
SYSTEMIC REGULATION (SR): a regulatory compact that imposes full
systemic integration between providers; in symbols:  ! 1;
QUALITY OF SERVICE REGULATION (QR): a regulatory compact that
sets serviceshedonic quality at its maximal levels, i.e., si = sj = s;
CO-PRODUCTION REGULATION (CR): a regulatory compact which forces
private rms to implement forms of coproduction such that c
0
i = cj > ci.
The satisfying regulatory solution is dened as the one that, in corre-
spondence of a SPE of the market game, minimizes L.
4 Managed Competition inMixed Quasi-markets
Using the above set-up, we are able to compare market outcomes in cor-
respondence of di¤erent regulatory solutions and, therefore, to give substance
to the idea of managed competition. Before doing this, however, we need to
determine, as a benchmark case, the results of competition without regulation.
The next Proposition characterizes the SPE of the unregulated market game.
Proposition 1: With no regulation, the strategy prole
 
pi ; p

j ; s

i ; s

j

such
that :
pi =
1
2
(cj + ci)  1
2


(1  )  sj   si  (9)
pj = cj
si = s 
1
1  
[(cj   ci) (cj + ci   4)]1=2
2
sj = s
is the unique SPE of the market game.
11Note that we do not have costs for quality, therefore public production will select always
the maximal quality livel.
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Proof: Take the FOCs with respect to price of both decision problems. As
it can be easily checked, they entail the following equilibrium prices in the last
stage of the market game: pj = cj and p

i =
1
2 (cj + ci)   12 [(1  ) (sj   si)].
By substituting expression (3), and equilibrium prices, into expression (4), we
can obtain playersobjective functions at the rst stage of the game. These are
given by:
Dj = 1 +
3
2
   (cj   ci)
2 [(1  ) (sj   si)] (10)
i =
1
2
[(cj + ci)   (1  ) (sj   si)  2ci]

(cj   ci)
(1  ) (sj   si)   

As usual, the FOCs with respect to s give us the best-reply functions
of the two rms. They are:
si = Ri (sj) = sj   1
1  
[(cj   ci) (cj + ci   4)]1=2
2
(11)
sj = Rj (si) = s
Intersecting these functions ends the proof12 . 
Intuitively, unregulated competition leads rms to select di¤erent mar-
ket strategies. The social rm sets competitive prices and the highest possible
hedonic quality. Contrarily, the prot-maximizing rm reduces service quality
in proportion with its cost advantage. The lower marginal cost of production
allows her to select lower prices, with respect to the social rms ones, and
to gain economic prots. Moreover, in coincidence of this market outcome
we observe a peculiar distribution of consumers. The relatively wealthier ones
buy from the social rm, while the others prefer the prot-oriented o¤er. In
this way, relatively poor consumers end to consume low quality goods. We
can link, therefore, Proposition 1s result to the "cream-skimming" argument
against quasi-markets. As well known, one of the main drawbacks of introduc-
ing prot-oriented providers in social services markets is that private rms, in
order to increase prots, might decide to serve only low cost consumers, and
to "cream-skim" the others. As obvious, such a practice raises equity concerns,
and it is one of the main fears which slow down pro-competitive reform of social
sectors13 . Proposition 1, however, illustrates that through mixed competition
12Note that in the SPE any level of  can be selected by private producers.
13Many of the possible drawbacks of introducing competition in social services markets are
discussed, for the NHS, in Chalkley and Malcomson (1996).
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is possible to soften the danger of cream-skimming by private providers. Since
only relatively poor consumers are served by prot-oriented rms, an excessive
focalization on low-cost and poor users will excessively reduce private providers
demand with serious consequences on their ability to remain in the market.
Quality degradation by prot-maximizing providers, indeed another
painful risk of quasi-market reforms, can be avoided in two ways. On the one
hand, we can have direct quality regulation14 ; on the other hand, coproduction
practices can be normatively imposed. The next two propositions deal with
these cases.
Proposition 2: Under a CR regime, both rms set prices equal to marginal
cost and implement maximal hedonic quality levels.
Proof: We need to check how the SPE of the market game changes when
a CR regime is implement. If this is the case, it must be that cj = c
0
i = c
and therefore, see expression (11), that sj = s

i = s. Now, by putting this last
condition in expression (9), we obtain that pi = p

j = c. Like in Loeb and Magat
(1979)s solution, we have marginal cost pricing. 
Proposition 3: Under a QR regime, the prot-oriented rm applies mark-
up, but its selling price is lower than the social rms one.
Proof: As above let us determine the SPE of the market game under a QR
regime. With quality regulation, it must be true that si = s

j = s. With this
regulatory constraint at hands, and by using expression (9), it is immediate to
verify that pi =
1
2 (cj + ci) > ci and p

j = cj with p

j > p

i . 
The main di¤erence between the CR regime and the QR one lays in
selling prices. Under a QR regime, even if it applies price margins, the prot-
oriented rm can keep the selling price below the social rms one. This price
reduction compensates consumers for the lack of active participation. In op-
position, under a CR regime, cost symmetry between rms determines equal
prices and no margins. In this case, maximal service quality is chosen by both
producers. Just to say: forcing prot-maximizers to mimic social rms can be
a way to control service quality. Finally, the last two propositions indirectly
conrm that in quasi-markets a direct relation between cost and quality exists.
As Chalkley and Malcomson (1996) conclude, in quasi-markets lower prices, as
a result of competition, may be associated with lower quality because providers
are force to reduce their costs. Our ndings, e.g. increasing costs entails quality
enhancement replies by private rms, conrm this relation.
In the perspective of social policy, another interesting nding is next
the next proposition..
Proposition 4: Under a SR regime, rms choose service maximum di¤er-
entiation. Moreover, equilibrium prices are equals to the QR regimes ones.
14Notice that a public enterprise may be modeled as an instrument to a¤ect quality in a
mixed oligopoly. See, e.g., Delbono, Denicolò and Scarpa (1996).
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Proof: The SR regime imposes  = 1: In this case, by looking at expression
(11), we can notice that in the SPE on the game we have sj = s and s

i !  1.
However, since the domain of quality is bounded, the prot-maximizing rm will
select, in the SPE of the market game, the minimal quality level (s). Equilibrium
prices, as can be checked by substituting quality equilibrium levels and  = 1
in expression (9), are the same of the previous case. 
Under a SR regime, systemic e¤ects are maximal given the high degree of
integration between provided services. Thus, the optimal behavior for the prot-
maximizing rm will be to free-ride social rms maximal quality. As a result,
maximal service di¤erentiation emerges. In other words, we can have, exactly
because of full integration, very dysfunctional services o¤ered by private rms
together with high quality ones provided by social rms. Therefore, at least
from a regulatory viewpoint, the centrality of integration strategies between
quasi-market providers seems signicantly reduced.
Finally, the next Proposition illustrates how the three regimes perform
in terms of social loss.
Proposition 5: In equilibrium, the following ranking holds:
LSR  LQR > LCR > 0 (12)
Proof: Take the loss function of expression (7) and consider SPE prices and
quality for the three alternative regulatory regimes. After some manipulations,
it is possible to get:
LSR =
1
2
(cj   ci) + (s  s) (13)
LQR =
1
2
(cj   ci) + (1  )
LCR = (1  )
By considering the values of our parameters, the ranking between ex-
pressions in (12) follows immediately. 
Indeed, the CR regime is the more aggressive regulatory solution and,
consistently, minimizes the social loss. In this case, the regulator disciplines
the methods of production by imposing, for instance, co-governance practices
or co-management institutions to private, prot-oriented rms. It is a sort of
public acceptance of the fact that coproduction paradigms of social rms create
social value, even if they increase average costs in quasi-markets. Service users
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pay more for a unit of service, but, given the absence of mark-up, this extra-
expenditure is simply the cost to be paid for active participation and stronger
empowerment.
In order to appreciate the signicance of the last Proposition, the idea of
quasi-market failure has to be reminded. Following Lowery (1998) and Kahko-
nen (2002), quasi-markets can fail, inter alia, because of imperfect competition
and, hence. the central question becomes under which conditions regulation
can reduce social losses due to the impossibility of perfect competition. Our
analysis shows a way to address the issue and concludes in favour of coproduc-
tion processes. Coproduction paradigms not only stimulate participation and
cultivate social responsibility and active citizenship, but they also work as mar-
ket discipline devices in the case of mixed competition. Surely, as emphasized
above, the main criticism to results of this sort is that the CR regime raises the
unitary cost of service. This is true, and this increase is the price to pay for a
well-performing regulation. Obviously, if the regulator wants to reduce the cost
of one unit of service, the CR regime produces very poor outcomes and the best
way to manage the quasi-market is to replace social rms with prot-oriented
ones.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed how to manage competition in quasi-
markets in which di¤erent service providers exist. The main conclusion of our
model is that in quasi-markets service coproduction can be a tool of regulation
and not only a way to increase service e¤ectiveness and users participation.
Social rms are, in this context, not only instruments for the empowerment
of citizens, but also models of production which gives us, by fostering active
citizenship and peoples empowerment, more e¤ective quasi-markets. This con-
clusion is reinforced by the fact that, without regulation, mixed quasi-markets
can generate a peculiar distribution of users between social service providers.
As we have shown, unregulated competition, in equilibrium, divides consumers
in two groups: the wealthy one, which purchases units of services by the social
rm, and the poor one, whose members are forced to buy from the prot-
oriented producer. This means that, without public surveillance of these mar-
kets, poor users, who reasonably have a deep need of social assistance, consume
badly-produced services of low quality. Hence, to avoid a new source of social
inequality, regulation of mixed quasi-markets is needed.
Finally, some observations on the relation between the idea of coproduc-
tion and the one of socially-responsable rms. Recently, development studies
have analyzed the concept of istitutionalised coproduction, i.e. the provision
of public services through a regular, long-term relation between State agencies
and organized groups of citizen, who make substantial contributions to the de-
livery of service (see, among the others, Joshi and Moore (2004)). This way
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of organizing social services is relatively widespread in poor countries and, in
those contexts, it is important to distinguish between logistical and governance
drivers of coproduction solutions. When the latters are weak, institutional
coproduction produces very bad results in terms of service quality. In more
economically-advanced market societies, social rms are the natural candidate
for implementing forms of service organization in which users play an active
role. In this context, coproduction paradigms can be a key institutional hinge
operationalizing the "technology of the community" (Rose (1999)) and fostering
active citizenship. Consistently, community services should be organized, by
using coproduction processes, as a "space of services, a natural, civic and extra-
political zone of human relations" (Rose (2000)). Nevertheless, social rms have
to institutionalize, govern and manage logistical, motivational and governance
tools for coproduction. In the lack of these instruments of economic democracy,
an important source of social change will be blocked.
In a lieu of conclusion, let us also mention possible research directions.
First of all, it is interesting to consider the sensitivity of our argument to the
number of players of the market game. Given that the e¤ects of competition
can vary when there are few or many service providers, an interesting research
program could be to consider more than two rms. Secondly, it should be
possible to introduce incomplete information for the regulator and, in this way,
to relate the quasi-market literature with La¤ont and Tirole (1993)s theory
of incentives in regulation. However, given the state of the art in the analytic
of quasi-markets, such an extensions seems us far to provide interesting policy
insights. Thirdly, an interesting extension of our model could entail a framework
in which rms can negotiate the degree of services integration. Excluding the
possibility of unregulated negotiation between players, the di¢ culty, in the last
case, is thinking to alternative negotiation protocols which may restrict parties
possibilities to some, not socially-wastefull, solutions. In doing this, mechanism
design tools and categories can be of great help. Finally, it could be interesting to
assume that the public authority aims to maximize, in virtue of the subsidiarity
principle, the total number of served consumers. In this case, the regulator
might operate as a Stackelberg follower and serve the residual demand unserved
by other suppliers.
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